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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that that which philosophers consider as being included in the domain 
of the aesthetic is a crucial aspect determining the plausibility of a narrative; that plausibility 
actually plays a more significant role than probability in many cognitive processes of 
deliberation and decision making; and that the aesthetics of story-telling is a technology of 
the plausible. 
We offer two case-studies, one an ancient account of deliberation and decision making, the 
other from a modern newspaper article, to illustrate our argument that the aesthetic is an 
essential element in various stages of the process of decision making, from determining what 
needs to be decided, through identifying the basis for decision making, to the act of decision 
making itself. In that context, we highlight the role of the aesthetic in the framing of future 
possibilities in the process of scenario planning. 
In conclusion, we propose that focusing on the aesthetics of story-telling as a technology to 
create and share plausibility is a useful way to analyse scenario stories in scenario-planning 
work; we hope that it may be a useful concept with which to develop further research in this 
area. 
1. Introduction 
In November 2013, the Spanish Economics Minister, Luis de Guindos, attempted to halt the 
appointment of José María Roldán as President of the Spanish Banking Association (AEB), 
which represents all commercial banks in the country. The reason given was that, at the time, 
Roldán was still heading the Financial Regulation and Stability Department at the Bank of 
Spain. De Guindos’ objection was not worded as having to do with a conflict of interest or 
put forth on ethical grounds. Instead, noting that Roldán, “a person who until very recently 
has participated in the preparation of the financial rules that have led to a crisis and a ransom 
of 40,000 million (euros)”,…would now “paid by the taxpayer,...remain in a senior 
accountability position in the sector”, the Minister argued that this change from regulator to 
the regulated sector was not “estético – it was not “aesthetic” (de Barrón, 2013). Why would 
a minister of economics in one of the countries that was most strongly hit by the global 
financial crisis say that the issue he had with this appointment was “(un)aesthetic”? 
This curious choice of terms did not go unnoticed at the time; in fact, it prompted 95 on-line 
comments posted within 48 hours on the website of the daily newspaper El País, mostly 
making fun of his choice. A year later, in November 2014 – as we started writing this paper – 
over 690,000 items appeared when one Googled the original El País headline “Guindos 
expresa a la banca su ‘malestar’ con su nuevo president” (or “Guindos expresses his malaise 
regarding the new president to the banking sector”). Many of these were comments 
suggesting that Guindo’s own “aesthetics” were also to be questioned, including those 
involved in his having himself moved from investment banker to minister. In the end, the 
Minister’s views had little effect: Roldán was unanimously elected to the position for an 
initial four-year term – so although De Guindos found his behaviour ugly, not enough people 
shared his perspective. This event illustrates the central point for our investigation in this 
paper, which argues for the importance of developing a better understanding of the creation 
of plausible arguments, and, specifically, the role of the aesthetic in the generation of 
plausibility. 
The core of our argument rests on the proposition that that which philosophers consider to be 
included in the domain of “the aesthetic” is a crucial aspect determining the plausibility of a 
narrative – and this matters insofar as plausibility may play a more significant role than 
probability in many cognitive processes of deliberation and decision making (Selin and 
Pereira, 2013 and Selin, 2011, with regard specifically to scenario planning). Here, we focus 
on the role of “the aesthetic” in the framing of future possibilities (cf. Judge, 1991), and 
suggest that achieving aesthetic excellence in stories enables scenario planners to excel at 
conveying plausible futures and the insights these hold to decision-makers in ways that are 
helpful to them in their framing of decision possibilities (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; 
Ramirez & Wilkinson, 2016). 
We describe the aesthetics of story-telling as a “technology” of plausibility. This may not be 
self-evident to futures scholars unfamiliar with social and technology studies (STS), but to 
those that are, it appears natural to consider a story (particularly if it has been written or 
recorded or is retold repeatedly) as a “frozen” insight and knowledge, accumulated over time, 
which can be used in different contexts, again and again, to enable sense giving and sense-
making (as Weick, 1995; 60–61). Latour (e.g., 2002) and other STS scholars have looked at 
how technologies encapsulate human action, freeze it, and make it available in contexts other 
than the one in which it arose. As Hutchins (1995) found in studying navigators in the South 
seas, technologies enable practices, and their successful use enables practitioner excellence. 
We stress that this technology can be wielded in a number of different ways, and suggest that 
this idea may be a fruitful concept for further research, opening up insights into how 
plausibility is generated, manifested, shared, used, and valued. 
The aesthetics of story-telling and story-sharing is, in fact, a very widespread and long-
running technology. Across cultures, humans employ narratives to make sense of events and 
experiences in the world around them, to share and test them with others with whom they 
might need to address the challenges and to exploit the opportunities these entail. Stories are 
not only factual descriptions, they manifest and convey implicit knowledge and are thus 
inescapably also experienced in aesthetic terms, expressing and conveying considerations of 
what “feels right”. It may be that the ubiquity of this technology has paradoxically made it 
and the roles it plays less visible – and seem less salient – than it deserves to be. This 
technology complements other technologies of the plausible, such as causal maps and graphic 
system diagrams (Wilkinson & Ramirez, 2016). We can compare it to pencils and paper 
perhaps: while the technology is very widespread and well accepted, it is rarely considered as 
a technology, precisely because it has become so very common. Like pencils and paper, the 
ubiquity and wide use of this technology of story-telling means it no longer requires a user 
manual: people (particularly in oral societies, but also in literate ones using writing and 
reading extensively) grow up with this technology. But in this paper, we propose to bring it 
back into view, to foreground it, and to explore it by delving into how it plays a role in 
shaping and co-producing the plausibility of a story in ways that makes the story useful in 
decision making and strategy (see Wilkinson, 2009). There is a huge literature on studies of 
strategy as narrative, of organisations as narratives, and of futures in terms of narrative 
(recent examples from this journal include Milojević and Inayatullah, 2015 and Raven and 
Elahi, 2015). We acknowledge but do not marshal these important literatures in this paper, 
which concentrates instead on the role of the aesthetics of story-telling as a technology of the 
plausible. Below we present first our understanding of aesthetics, then of plausibility; we 
examine the relationship between the two, and how aesthetics in stories can be understood as 
a technology of plausibility; finally, we illustrate our argument with two case studies. 
2. What is aesthetics?
1
 
Philosophy explores how we experience and perceive, how we conceive and understand and 
order, how we know ourselves and the world(s) we inhabit and bring about, and how all of 
these are inter-related. The study of aesthetics in philosophy deals with those understandings, 
perceptions, conceptions, and experiences that we qualify (often after the fact) with adjectives 
such as ‘beautiful’, “ugly”, “elegant”, or “repulsive”. Aesthetic knowledge is considered to 
depend largely on sensing and feeling, on empathy and intuition, and on critically examining 
how we relate conception to perception, without as well as with words: it offers “sensory 
knowing versus intellectual/propositional knowing” (Taylor & Hansen, 2005). 
There is growing evidence from cognitive psychology and neurobiology (Damasio, 2000) 
that aesthetic forms of knowing precede other forms, and shape how these other forms of 
knowing operate. This had already been proposed by philosophers such as Cassirer (1964) 
and Langer (1942). If so, the pattern recognition involved in sense perception and the forming 
of ideas, precedes the formalisation of these into concepts and their manifestation as words. 
Thus in mathematics “the motivational aesthetic does not merely catch the mathematician’s 
attention, rather it serves the necessary role of framing the very way problems and initial 
conjectures are identified” (Sinclair, 2004, 277). And in analyzing modernity and comparing 
his views to Beck’s and Giddens’, Lash concluded that: “Well before the post-traditional 
society of the past two decades, the first instantiation of reflexive modernity was through the 
aesthetic” (1994, 212). 
As this cognitive analysis suggests, whether and how someone finds some (particular) thing 
“beautiful” or “ugly” is subjective depending on taste, and this aspect can vary according to 
one’s situation before, during and at the time of an experience. But culture, or rather cultures, 
play a particularly important role in shaping those perspectives. As Bourdieu (1979) noted, 
different cultures shape what groups and the individuals in them consider in aesthetic terms 
(e.g. opera, soccer, nature, etc.). Thus, for the field of law, Schlagg proposed that: “Law is an 
aesthetic enterprise. Before the ethical dreams and political ambitions … can even be 
articulated … aesthetics have already shaped the medium within which those 
projects…work” (Schlagg, 2002, 1049). He reported that if a judge’s work is premised upon 
an aesthetic where justice is organised as pigeonhole categories, she will first consider in 
which category the case fits; whereas if the aesthetic of the law she uses instead is justice as a 
field of forces, consideration will be given to the forces and counterforces that exert 
themselves upon the case and to which the case will contribute. Thus, the “same” case would 
be treated very differently, depending on the aesthetic that is at play – more often than not, 
implicitly and unquestioned. 
In this paper we fully acknowledge cultural differences (as will be seen from our case 
studies) but we are Kantian in the sense that we consider aesthetics to be a universal 
characteristic of mindful activity, which plays out in each culture in its own culturally 
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determined way. But either framing still leaves the question of exactly how and why 
aesthetics can achieve this – what knowledge is it that aesthetics conveys and how does this 
become a basis for judgment? The answer we find most persuasive is to frame aesthetics in 
terms of connection (Sandelands, 1998 and Taylor and Hansen, 2005): that is, as shared 
forms or systems that allow individuals to express their sense of relationality. Aesthetic 
responses shape our judgments, and these are informed by a combination of personal, 
subjective experiences, informed by shared cultural frames, and shaped by and expressing 
relationality within our culture. As a result, we conclude that aesthetics in stories can be 
regarded as a technology in the sense of Latour (1990): a technology that creates the 
plausible. 
 
3. What is “plausibility”? 
Bosch (2010, 387) offers a succinct characterisation to answer the question posed in our sub-
heading: a theory can be accepted as plausible when it is “in accordance with (practical) 
empirical findings; subjective/intersubjective ideas, thoughts, and feelings; and the opinions 
of and cultural categories used by others”. In attempting to define plausibility, it may help 
briefly to look at its close but confusing relationship to the construct of probability. We note 
that, in the field of scenario planning specifically, defining this relationship is an ongoing 
challenge: “Attempts to clarify the general methodological confusion about scenario practices 
– practices which encompass probable, plausible or possible futures – is already evident” 
(Wilkinson, 2009: 110). The key word in this passage is “attempts”: as of 2009; there was no 
clear resolution. Indeed, Ramírez and Selin (2014) found that scholars in scenario planning 
who argued for either “plausibility” or “probability” as their preferred approach to creating 
persuasive futures often overlooked the potency of the “other” approach. 
Ramírez and Selin (2014) surveyed, more generally, the long history of confusion relating 
these terms to each other. They found that a distinction between them began to be developed 
at the end of the seventeenth century, when, most notably thanks to Locke, probability was 
established as inference when insufficient experiential evidence was available in scientific 
pursuits. In contrast, plausibility from its very beginning lent itself to what today is called 
“spin”; one of its earliest meanings is “the disposition to approve” (1558; see the Oxford 
English Dictionary; s.v. “Plausibility”). An examination of its uses over time (ibid.) indicates 
how, in the eighteenth century, the meaning of each term became more distinct, as probability 
became something served and even defined by mathematical calculus and took a central role 
in statistics, while plausibility continued in its original sense of providing “the appearance of 
believability and credibility”. But this developing distinction became blurred when Bayes 
brought subjectivity into probability, also in the eighteenth century: as Ramírez and Selin 
(2014) observed; “Bayesian probability” denotes a degree of belief considered to be objective 
and rational. It moves the meaning of probability beyond “the relative frequency of 
occurrence of an outcome in given conditions…” and re-confuses probability and plausibility 
with each other. For followers of Bayes, probability measures belief; whereas plausibility 
simply proposes it. Although metrics seem to matter much more to measures of probability 
than impressions of plausibility, they are not; as we will see below, sufficient to be 
compelling. 
The relations between probability and plausibility remains a source of debate in scientific 
inquiry: although Meckler and Baillie (2003, 276) proposed that the usefulness provided by 
scientific method was precisely the move from plausibility to the more calculable probability, 
Bosch argued that, in practice, plausibility is a better assessment of truth within a 
constructivist epistemology. Indeed, away from the world of theory, in arenas where these 
questions are played out in real-time, there is little disagreement on the core importance of 
plausibility in producing a convincing argument. As John Kay argued in the Financial Times 
( Kay, 2013), in a legal setting, a good (in the sense of “plausible”) story “balances 
probabilities” in the eyes of the court, and may help to render someone guilty or innocent in a 
way that probability as percentage of being right cannot do. Remember, it was plausibility 
(“plausible deniability”) that was used by the Reagan administration to conceal how much the 
US president really knew about the Iran – Contra affair (Cheit, undated). 
These observations may be supported by arguments the authors have made to the effect that 
practical wisdom/judgment (phronesis) has an important aesthetic element ( Eidinow & 
Ramirez, 2012). They have argued that this interpretation is supported by research on types of 
deliberation conducted within organisations: the use of aesthetics as a heuristic tool for 
clarifying cognitive processes now extends across a wide range of research; examples include 
the analysis of organizations ( Ramirez, 1987, Ramirez, 1991 and Ramirez, 1996) and how 
people in them behave and understand them (Strati, 1999); urban policy – and how it is 
enacted (Floyd, 1983); management of forests (Gobster, 1999); decision making at NASA – 
and how it comes to be ineffective (Feldman 2000); the selection of personnel at service 
firms (Warhurst, Nickson, Witz, & Cullen, 2000); the evaluation of formulae in theoretical 
physics (Farmelo, 2002); and the preferences of managers in selecting modes of business 
innovation (Ramírez & Arvidsson, 2005). 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to draw attention to what these arguments 
suggest about the role of cultural frameworks in the perception of plausibility, which allows 
us to build a link between plausibility and aesthetics. If shared cultural knowledge informs 
our sense of plausibility, this, we argue, is informed by the relationality created by a shared 
aesthetic: thus, crafting the aesthetic (pleasing or not) becomes a technology of the plausible. 
Some understanding of how a plausible or “good” story may be developed has been 
examined by Wilkinson and Ramírez (2010), who proposed that one thing that makes 
plausibility unique and uniquely helpful is that it has to be co-constructed in conversation. 
Thus, what person A considers plausible to start with may not convince person B, who 
queries how that first plausibility [P1] could actually come to be. Person A reflects on this 
criticism, and accepts that some qualification is needed to persuade B of the plausibility of 
what he or she has said. After reviewing P1 in light of person B’s criticisms, person A issues 
a second revised version P1.1 – this process may continue until person A convinces person B, 
and both agree that version P1.n is plausible, and take it to person C. The process may then 
be repeated, further versions developed, in light of objections, and finally P2 is released. In 
this sense, the process of revising a story draft to enhance its plausibility may be compared 
with a process of debugging software from the “beta” version to one that is good enough to 
be released to potential users. 
This process helps us to envision something of the way in which story-telling is a 
collaborative process, which resonates with van der Heijden’s (2005) idea of the art of 
“strategic conversation” used in strategic planning, and the link between strategic 
conversation and the development of new, unique, shared insights. However, the process 
described above comes across as primarily intellectual, and it rather takes for granted the 
nature of plausibility. As we have suggested, the creation of plausibility, and the judgment 
that a narrative possesses plausibility (i.e., how we determine that a story is itself plausible), 
depends not only on our intellectual capabilities, but also on the aesthetic each of us, 
individually or in groups, has developed, which is a result of our cultural frames and sense of 
relationality. We note here how the process of co-creating a story may actualise that sense of 
relationality, thus enhancing the sense of plausibility. In the next section, we illustrate these 
processes with two examples, one ancient and one modern. 
4. Case studies, ancient and modern 
4.1. Riddles from Delphi 
Our first example involves a story by the ancient historian, Herodotus (7.139–143) 
concerning one of the Athenian responses to the invasion by an army led by King Xerxes in 
the early fifth century. Herodotus reports that the Athenians sent an embassy to the oracular 
sanctuary at Delphi to consult the priestess there, the so-called “Pythia”. While possessed by 
the god Apollo, this priestess would provide answers to the questions posed by consultants, 
and tradition indicates that these were given in the form of riddling verses, which the 
consultant must resolve. The veracity of this process is debated by scholars who propose that, 
in fact, the answers were likely to have been more straightforward (“yes” or “no” responses, 
or cult instructions), while the more elaborate responses were the result of later literary 
elaboration (see for example, Bowden, 2005, esp. 34; cf. Maurizio, 1995). But whichever 
historical interpretation is preferred, it can be argued that oracular consultation demonstrates 
the role of aesthetics in decision making, revealing the ways in which knowledge may be 
based not on intellectual judgment, but rather on a felt sense of “what is right”, which 
depends on a specific cultural framework. 
In his story Herodotus recounts that the Athenian ambassadors approached the Pythia and, to 
begin with, received a response that was horrifying: it told them to go home immediately, 
conveying a message that the Athenians must evacuate their city, which would be burned, 
while its temples ran with blood. The ambassadors were upset by the message from the oracle 
and felt hopeless, but then they were advised to make a second consultation. The response 
they received this second time was slightly more appealing: it appeared to tell them to retreat, 
it warned them that they would lose much of what they now owned, but to “trust in their 
wooden walls”, and that Salamis would be a location that would “bring death to women’s 
sons.” They wrote it down, and took it back to Athens… And there, a huge debate took place: 
some argued that the “wooden wall” meant the thorn hedge that had once surrounded the 
Acropolis; others that it meant the Athenian navy. In the end, we are told by Herodotus, the 
general Themistocles led the way towards the development of an interpretation that most felt 
they could support. The chresmologues (professional oracle interpreters) had interpreted the 
“wooden walls” as meaning the Athenian fleet, but stated that this meant an Athenian defeat. 
The general Themistocles, in contrast, argued that Salamis would mark the location of a 
Persian defeat. Herodotus notes for us how the Athenians perceived his interpretation as, 
literally, something “more to be chosen” (as Eidinow, 2013). Themistocles’ version of the 
oracle persuaded them that Delphi was telling them to prepare to do battle at sea. The 
majority of Athenians followed this strategy – and, in brief, in the battle of Salamis they led 
the Greeks to victory over the Persians. 
This historical account provides a useful overview of a process of deliberation in which 
aesthetics plays a key role in shaping judgments of plausibility and decision making. The first 
consultation by the Athenians produced a story about the future that the Athenians found all-
too plausible: they were presented with a completed narrative, which confirmed their worst 
fears. Significantly, the messengers were unwilling to carry this message back to the city 
because it was so bad, not because they felt it was wrong or they did not understand it; 
indeed, it was very clear and must have seemed highly probable, aligning with their 
intellectual understanding of the current situation. In contrast, the second consultation was 
more complex: its riddling form demanded a resolution that would satisfy everyone. It came 
during a process of debate, in which, as a community, the Athenians reframed their decision 
to remain. Here again we have to examine the basis for their judgment: it was not that they 
thought that Themistocles was intellectually accurate; rather, according to Herodotus, it was 
because his interpretation allowed them to behave bravely, putting up a fight against the 
invaders, rather than running away. Thus, the Athenians interpreted the riddle according to 
their shared aesthetic sense of what was “right”, which included a strong, shared 
understanding of Athenian identity. 
4.2. Riddles from Florida 
The second story brings us back to the present, and concerns two incompatible views on the 
future of one of the wealthiest parts of the United States – Miami Beach. One view is dire, 
and is held by scientists. We quote here from the article in the British daily newspaper The 
Guardian ( McKie, 2014): 
“Climate change is no longer viewed as a future threat round here,” says atmosphere expert 
Professor Ben Kirtman, of the University of Miami. “It is something that we are having to 
deal with today.”…“Every year, with the coming of high spring and autumn tides, the sea 
surges up the Florida coast and hits the west side of Miami Beach, which lies on a long, thin 
island that runs north and south across the water from the city of Miami. The problem is 
particularly severe in autumn when winds often reach hurricane levels. Tidal surges are 
turned into walls of seawater that batter Miami Beach’s west coast and sweep into the resort’s 
storm drains, reversing the flow of water that normally comes down from the streets above. 
Instead seawater floods up into the gutters of Alton Road, the first main thoroughfare on the 
western side of Miami Beach, and pours into the street. Then the water surges across the rest 
of the island… Hence the construction work at Alton Road, where $400 m is now being spent 
in an attempt to halt these devastating floods by improving Miami Beach's stricken system of 
drains and sewers. In total, around $1.5 bn is to be invested in projects aimed at holding back 
the rising waters. Few scientists believe the works will have a long-term effect. 
What makes Miami exceptionally vulnerable to climate change is ... geology. The city – and 
its satellite towns and resorts – is built on a dome of porous limestone which is soaking up the 
rising seawater, slowly filling up the city's foundations and then bubbling up through drains 
and pipes. Sewage is being forced upwards and fresh water polluted. Miami's low topography 
only adds to these problems. There is little land … that rises more than six feet above sea 
level. Many condos and apartment blocks open straight on the edge of the sea. Of the total of 
4.2 million US citizens who live at an elevation of four feet or less, 2.4 million of them live in 
south Florida. 
At Florida International University, geologist Peter Harlem has created a series of maps that 
chart what will happen as the sea continues to rise. These show that by the time oceans have 
risen by four feet – a fairly conservative forecast – most of Miami Beach, Key Biscayne, 
Virginia Key and all the area’s other pieces of prime real estate, will be bathtubs. At six feet, 
Miami city’s waterfront and the Florida Keys will have disappeared. The world’s busiest 
cruise ship port, which handles four million passengers, will disappear beneath the waves. 
‘This is the fact of life about the ocean: it is very, very powerful,’ says Harlem.” 
The other view – the other story – is held and offered by the politicians, who deny climate 
change and thus the possibility of its wiping out of the city. As The Guardian put it, 
“Most of Florida’s senior politicians – in particular, Senator Marco Rubio, former governor 
Jeb Bush and current governor Rick Scott, all Republican climate-change deniers – have 
refused to act or respond to warnings of people like Wanless or Harlem or to give media 
interviews to explain their stance, though Rubio, a Republican party star and a possible 2016 
presidential contender, has made his views clear in speeches. ‘I do not believe that human 
activity is causing these dramatic changes to our climate the way these scientists are 
portraying it. I do not believe that the laws that they propose we pass will do anything about 
it, except it will destroy our economy,’ he said recently.” 
This more attractive description of the “resilience and unfettered economic growth and well-
being” of Miami, which is offered by the politicians, appears to be holding sway over the 
calamity aesthetic of the story offered by the scientists – despite the scientific evidence and 
growing rate of flooding reported by the newspaper. So, according to The Guardian story: 
“What really surprises visitors and observers is the city’s response, or to be more accurate, its 
almost total lack of reaction. The local population is steadily increasing; land prices continue 
to surge; and building is progressing at a generous pace. During my visit last month, signs of 
construction – new shopping malls, cranes towering over new condominiums and scaffolding 
enclosing freshly built apartment blocks – could be seen across the city, its backers 
apparently oblivious of scientists’ warnings that the foundations of their buildings may be 
awash very soon.” 
This example illustrates how a judgment about plausibility or implausibility depends on the 
audience’s response to the aesthetics of each story, and its alignment with the prevalent 
aesthetic. Here, one story offers a very attractive vision of a sunny retirement, the other a 
catastrophic future, comprising a soon-to-be ruined community and dashed hopes; one offers 
an aesthetic of hope and comfort, the other of desperation. The first aligns with the prevailing 
aesthetic of the community (and certainly of the politicians), while the other does not. The 
idea that Miami will disappear (and soon, too), with huge economic, societal, and possibly 
humanitarian crises ensuing, is hugely uncomfortable knowledge. As The Guardian put it, 
“Miami and its surroundings are facing a calamity worthy of the Old Testament.” Moreover, 
in contrast to the Herodotean example, where making sense of Delphi’s ambiguous message 
involved getting together and debating its meaning, in this modern example, no process of 
interactive sense-making is reported. 
5. Analysis 
Both examples, from past and present, reveal story-telling and -hearing as dynamic, creative 
and multi-dimensional processes that invite engagement not just (or not at all) with factuality, 
but with other kinds of knowledge. In each case, those judging the plausibility of what they 
hear do so on the basis of what feels “right”, that is, according to their aesthetic 
understanding. We must emphasise that when we argue this, we are obviously drawing 
attention to aesthetics that are peculiar to a time and place, and not arguing that specific 
aesthetics are universal. 
The first example, from Herodotus reveals a multi-faceted role for aesthetics in a process of 
decision making. There were a variety of ways in which aesthetics were involved in an 
oracular consultation at Delphi, including the materiality and natural beauty of the location 
and the physical ritual of consultation, elements that were, arguably, involved in supporting 
the apparent authority that Delphi claimed. But, above all, oracular consultation involved a 
process of developing (alternative) stories about the future, and, as we have argued, the 
process of story-telling itself is an inherently aesthetic process. Our case study, which 
provides an example of a double oracular response, demonstrates how story-telling can be 
harnessed to create different options, the aesthetic of the story evoking feelings that a 
particular option may be plausible (or not), and therefore actionable (or not). Moreover, we 
may also see here the role of the relationality of aesthetics writ large: the final decision was 
one that was made in discussion with others, even, it could be said, in collaboration with 
supernatural forces (Eidinow, 2013). The Athenians developed their explanation of the 
oracle’s response together in line with what felt right – in this case, their sense of Athenian 
identity. We should note that not everyone in the city agreed; a group of citizens opted for a 
different interpretation and stayed in Athens. However, they seem still to have shared in the 
same underlying aesthetic – it felt right to them to stay and fight. That their understanding 
manifested in a different response to the question of the plausibility of Themistocles’ 
narrative could be taken to indicate that his manipulation of the aesthetic technology was only 
partially successful. 
Our second example demonstrates how a story with an aesthetic that is too unappealing, too 
ugly, and too distant to be felt closely therefore exerts a weaker effect; it is not (yet) 
considered plausible. This may be because those involved have had no direct felt experience 
of what the story expresses or its implications (Weber, 2006), and without personal 
experience of what the story conveys, the vision of a climate change-infested future is simply 
too uncomfortable to be felt as plausible. This idea has been explored in terms of other man-
made horrors, recently for example regarding the massive collective denial of the Indonesian 
massacre of about one million people (“eight times the combined death toll of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki”) by the perpetrators, now in power, as conveyed by Joshua Oppenheimer and 
analysed by Beatty (2015). 
This raises the question of how to make plausible information that is not aesthetically 
appealing and which thus becomes “uncomfortable” (Coulson 1985, cited in Stein, 1988: 
195). A story that is aesthetically attributed as ugly can still be considered intriguing and 
worth further study. In the field of strategic planning, this is important: engaging with 
aesthetically unappealing knowledge or questions may prompt the creation of “new 
connections that enable alternative perceptions to transcend such categories” (Ramírez, 
2008). To do this new aesthetics are required, which may be achieved through the co-creation 
of stories. The process of reframing a future together encourages people to participate in 
creating the futures described in the stories. As the example from Herodotus illustrates, when 
stories are co-created for plausibility, this process can allow people to surface and to check 
their assumptions, to reveal the risks involved, to imagine options for action, to think through 
the possibilities, which might otherwise be missed. Shared stories are able to unite a 
community, playing a role in creating the sense of connection that comprises aesthetic 
knowledge. In contrast, stories that are not shared – perhaps because their aesthetics entail 
implausibility – do not build or sustain community; instead they manifest, and can even 
deepen, division. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the role of aesthetics in making stories plausible is a crucial one. The 
crafting of the “right” aesthetic in a story – one that appeals to or challenges an overriding 
aesthetic of a culture or community – is thus a significant factor in contexts of decision 
making. That this aspect has been largely overlooked is, we suggest, because it is so 
pervasive in everyday experience that its salience has been taken for granted. With this paper, 
we hope to draw attention to its role, suggesting that the aesthetics of story-making be 
regarded as a technology of the plausible. 
Our two case studies offer examples of how powerful such a technology may be. They show 
how stories about possible futures do not just describe a future, they can also generate actions 
(or indeed, inactions) that contribute to it. Story-making, story-telling, and story-sharing 
achieve this, in part, by means of their aesthetics, which interact with other forms of sensory 
knowledge to enhance (or not) a sense of plausibility. This allows us to add to the description 
of Weick (1995, 60-1), when he argues that “A good story holds disparate elements together 
long enough to energize and guide action, plausibly enough to allow people to make 
retrospective sense of whatever happens, and engagingly enough that others will contribute 
their own inputs in the interest of sensemaking.” We agree with this summary, but note that 
by adding the aesthetic aspect, we can begin to understand why stories may seem plausible, 
and, in turn, why they energise and guide, and, above all, may encourage individuals to 
engage and contribute. Thus, we propose that focusing on the aesthetics of stories as a 
technology to create and share plausibility is a useful way to analyse scenario stories in 
scenario-planning work; we hope that it may be a useful concept with which to develop 
further research in this area. 
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